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Documents

March 3, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

March 26, 1954

Molotov's Proposal that the USSR Join NATO, March 1954

In this memorandum to the Soviet Presidium, Foreign Minister Molotov proposes that the Soviet Union publicly state its willingness to consider joining NATO. He explains that the proposal is intended to disrupt the formation of the European Defense Community and the rearmament of West Germany, and also limit the United State's influence in Europe.

April 24, 1985

Address by Willy Brandt before the Council on Foreign Relations

Willy Brandt speaks about East-West relations, specifically focusing on what he views as U.S. misconceptions about nuclear arms, and the concept of Common Security.

November 14, 1984

Protocol resulting from discussions between the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the KGB of the Soviet Union

Both parties discuss the detection of and preparation for a surprise nuclear rocket attack by the USA on socialist countries, the intentions of the main hostile countries- the USA, other NATO countries, the People’s Republic of China- and cooperation to fight ideological diversion from hostile countries and emigrant populations. The two also agree to economic, tourism and cultural exchanges.

December 1, 1977

Agreement between the Soviet KGB and Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior from the summer of 1978 to 1980

In order to combat the perceived threat of hostile, foreign special agents operating on Soviet and Czechoslovak territory, the two parties agree to centralize their efforts to ensure the security of the two countries. In order to counter the special agents of capitalist countries and preserve the security of state secrets, the two parties decide to exchange counter-intelligence activity on subversive activity in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The two parties agree to focus on citizens of capitalist countries such as the United States, England, France and other NATO member nations and citizens of the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic in their intelligence efforts. Specifically, the parties agree to monitor citizens of these countries working in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and people working for representative agencies of the aforementioned countries. Also being monitored are Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens returning from capitalist or developing countries, corresponding with people in capitalist countries and having an address in a capitalist country. In conclusion, the KGB and Czechoslovak Interior Ministry agree to regular, bilateral exchange of information on hostile residents of both countries who are thought to be in the employ of the special intelligence services of NATO countries and China.